JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. Abstract A comprehensive study of the available documents about the Bay of Pigs, including many that have been declassified within the last eighteen months, and extensive interviews with the protagonists in the CIA, the White House and the State Department lead me to conclude that the disastrous operation was launched not simply because Kennedy was poorly served by his young staff and was the captive of his campaign rhetoric, nor simply because of the hubris of the CIA. Rather, the Bay of Pigs was approved because the CIA and the White House assumed they were speaking the same language when, in fact, they were speaking in utterly different tongues. My questions led me to ferret through the documents in the Kennedy Library in Boston and the Eisenhower Library in Abilene.4 But the documents cannot tell the whole story, not only because much remains to be declassified, but also because there is much that was never consigned to paper.5 Therefore, I went to the protagonists -to former officials in the CIA, the White House and the State Department.
A name that recurs often in documents dealing with the operation is that of Tracy Barnes, the Assistant Deputy for Plans. Barnes was brought into the Cuban operation at Dulles's suggestion, and he was given the same role that he had had in PBSUCCESS, that is, second in command. But he had been assigned to the operation late; Esterline, Hawkins and Beerli already reported to Bissell. Barnes therefore became an adviser rather than second in command, and represented the CIA in meetings with other agencies and at the White House. 'Allen Dulles was always putting Tracy Barnes in', remarked Helms. 'Sadly, Barnes didn't contribute anything. But Allen was fond of him and was always pushing him on someone. Barnes was not a fellow who carried much weight. He was very debonnaire.' (Interview with Helms) 32 'Narrative', p. 2. The cable concluded: 'Tentative approval pending. Will advise.'42 From that time on, notes a later enquiry, 'there is no evidence that the members of the assault force received any further preparation for guerrilla-type operations. The men became deeply imbued with the importance of the landing operation and its superiority over any form of guerrilla action to the point that it would have been difficult to persuade them to return to a guerrilla-type mission. '43 This change in the concept is of crucial importance. It is necessary to investigate the reasons for it and the manner in which it was approved. In a February 1961 memo, Bissell explained why the CIA had abandoned the guerrilla concept in favour of amphibious invasion: the infiltration of guerrilla groups would fall short of the required 'minimum The CIA and the Bay of Pigs 1 critical mass', he argued. That is, it 'would not produce a psychological effect sufficient to precipitate general uprisings or wide-spread revolt among disaffected elements of Castro's armed forces'. To achieve this, a 'minimum critical mass', was required, which meant the amphibious landing of the battalion 'presently undergoing unit training'.44 Time and again, the explanation was that the amphibious attack would serve as 'a catalyst to a general uprising', a 'shock action'.45
After reading the above paragraph, Bissell remarked:
The real reason for the shift from infiltration to amphibious invasion is that by October we had made a major effort at infiltration and resupply, and those efforts had been unsuccessful. My conviction was that we simply would not be able to organize a secure movement in Cuba. We had made, I think, at least five infiltrations by small boats and in each case the people had been picked up in a day or two. We had also made several air drops of supplies, but in most cases there was always a delay of several days between the request for resupply and the actual drop, and several times during that gap of time the people who originally made the request had moved. We had no direct radio communication with the small rebel groups. We may have made one or two infiltrations of men by air, but the majority entered by sea. Therefore we simply had to give up the effort to build a safe underground with communications and command and control.46
As Bissell pointed out, these two reasons -the need for a 'catalyst' and the weakness of the guerrillas in Cuba -were complementary. As to when the shift in concept was approved, the record is clear. 'We were concerned about the possibility of losing our bases', the senior CIA operative in Guatemala explained. 'President Ydfgoras requested that we make an airborne landing, which we did. I was in 60 The concept envisages the seizure of a small lodgement on Cuban soil by an allCuban amphibious/airborne force of about 750 men. The landings in Cuba will be preceded by a tactical air preparation, beginning at dawn of D-I Day.... Close air support will be provided to the invasion force on D-Day and thereafter as long as the force is engaged in combat. The primary targets during this time will be opposing military formations in the field. Particular efforts will be made to interdict opposing troop movements against the lodgement.
The initial mission of the invasion force will be to seize and defend a small area, which under the ideal conditions will include an airfield and access to the sea for logistical support. Plans must provide, however, for the eventuality that the force will be driven into a tight defensive formation which will preclude supply by sea or control of an airfield. Under such circumstances supply would have to be provided entirely by air drop. The primary objective of the force will be to survive and maintain its integrity on Cuban soil. There will be no early attempt to break out of the lodgement for further offensive operations unless and until there is a general uprising against the Castro regime or overt military intervention by United States forces has taken place.
It is expected that these operations will precipitate a general uprising throughout Cuba and cause the revolt of large segments of the Cuban Army and Militia. The lodgement, it is hoped, will serve as a rallying point for the thousands who are ready for overt resistance to Castro but who hesitate to act until they can feel some assurance of success. A general revolt in Cuba, if one is successfully triggered by our operations, may serve to topple the Castro regime within a period of weeks.
If matters do not eventuate as predicted above, the lodgement established by our force can be used as the site for establishment of a provisional government which can be recognized by the United States, and hopefully by other American states, and given overt military assistance. The way will then be paved for United States military intervention aimed at pacification of Cuba, and this will result in the prompt overthrow of the Castro Government. 
Piero Gleijeses
While this paper is directed to the subject of strike operations, it should not be presumed that other paramilitary programs will be suspended or abandoned... They include the supply by air and sea of guerrilla elements in Cuba, the conduct of sabotage operations, the introduction of specially trained paramilitary teams, and the expansion of our agent networks throughout the island.78
The key points of this plan were: (a) continuous massive air superiority would be used against Cuban troops; (b) uprisings against Castro should occur within weeks of the landing; and (c) should these uprisings not occur or should they fail, the United States would intervene militarily and overtly in response to the appeals of a provisional government established in the lodgement. The possibility that the invaders would turn into a guerrilla force if they found they were losing was not even mentioned.
This seems the most realistic of all the plans, certainly far more so than Trinidad and, above all, Zapata, except for the fact that it assumed that only 750 men would be required. The stress on air power is appropriate:
The question has been raised in some quarters as to whether the amphibious/ airborne operation could not be mounted without tactical air preparation or support or with minimal air support.... Since our invasion force is very small in comparison to forces which may be thrown against it, we must compensate for numerical inferiority by effective tactical air support not only during the landing but thereafter as long as the force remains in combat. It is essential that opposing military targets such as artillery parks, tank parks, supply dumps, military convoys and troops in the field be brought under effective and continuing air attack. Psychological considerations also make such attacks essential. The spectacular aspects of air operations will go far toward producing the uprising in Cuba that we seek.79
In fact, if the CEF was to have any hope of holding the lodgement, it would only be through the massive use of air power. The airstrikes would come whether or not the CEF held an airport, and the plan even suggested On 8 February, Bundy spelled out these differences in a memo to the President that also expressed his scepticism about the operation:
When you have your meeting this afternoon on Cuba, I think you will find that there is a divergence of view between State on the one hand and CIA and Defense on the other. Defense and CIA now feel quite enthusiastic about the invasion from Guatemala -at worst they think the invaders would get into the mountains, and at best they think they might get a full-fledged civil war in which we could then back the anti-Castro forces openly. State Department takes a much cooler view, primarily because of its belief that the political consequences would be very grave both in the United Nations and in Latin America. I think they will urge careful and extended diplomatic discussions with other American states, looking toward an increasing diplomatic isolation of Cuba and the Dominican Republic before any drastic action is taken. This divergence of view has not been openly and plainly considered in recent task force discussions, as I understand it. Therefore, you are quite likely to hear it in quite fresh form this afternoon. [White House aide] Dick Goodwin has been in on most of the Cuban discussions, and he and I join in believing that there should certainly not be an invasion adventure without careful diplomatic soundings. We also think it almost certain that such soundings would confirm the judgement you are likely to hear from State.88
The meeting with the President took place on the afternoon of 8 They have concluded that 'this plan has a fair chance of ultimate success' (that is of detonating a major and ultimately successful revolt against Castro) and that, if ultimate success is not achieved there is every likelihood that the landing can be the means of establishing in favorable terrain a powerful guerrilla force which could be sustained almost indefinitely. The latter outcome would not be (and need not appear as) a serious defeat. It would be the means of exerting continuing pressure on the regime and would be a continuing demonstration of inability of the regime to establish order. It could create an opportunity for an OAS intervention to impose a cease-fire and hold elections.
a. Any evaluation of the chances of success of the assault force should be realistic about the fighting qualities of the militia. No definitive conclusions can be advanced but it must be remembered that the majority of the militia are not fighters by instinct or background and are not militiamen by their own choice. Their training has been slight and they have never been exposed to actual fire (particularly any heavy fire power) nor to air attack. Moreover, the instabilities within Cuba are such that if the tide shifts against the regime, the chances are strong that substantial numbers will desert or change sides.
b. There is no doubt that the paramilitary forces would be widely assumed to be U.S. supported. Nevertheless, this conclusion would be difficult to prove and the scale of its activity would not be inconsistent The two papers defined the scope of the debate. The key agreement was that the operation would not succeed unless it was followed by uprisings or large scale desertations. Mann thought this unlikely, so he believed the operation would fail. Bissell thought the opposite, so the operation stood a very good chance of success; moreover, he stressed, if the uprisings failed to materialise, the invaders could melt into the countryside and establish a powerful guerrilla force.
In the middle was Kennedy. It was a very uncomfortable position. Reports on the strength of the Castro government were contradictory, depending on the agent. In the Task Force, many of the old hands were inclined to put the best face on it [i.e.: to stress the fragility of the regime].
We clearly understood what the army situation was in Guatemala [at the time of PBSUCCESS]. In Cuba it was very difficult to get hold of anything that was going on in Castro's army; it was very difficult to find an asset. We felt that the militia would tend to melt away. We had a number of the old military officers with us [in the Task Force]; their view was: it's nothing, we will cream the army. We knew that this was hogwash but we didn't think that the military was a tough But the guerrilla option was important in a different way: as a way to reassure Kennedy that the operation could not fail. This is why the CIA referred to it repeatedly when briefing the President. This is why Bissell objections' to restrictions they deemed unwise was that 'We felt that when the chips were down -when the crisis arose in reality, any action required for success would be authorized rather than permit the enterprise to fail. ' . 'I will say, I would have to say in any discussion of the Bay of Pigs, that I'm as sure as I'm sitting here that if this had all developed in the Eisenhower administration, President Eisenhower would have seen it through to its conclusion. Because I remember him saying to the group in the very beginning, when he began to approve training, he said, "Now boys, I want to tell you something. Unless you're going to look at this thing as something you are going to see through from beginning to end, let's not start anything." He repeatedly told them that, when they were considering the thing. He said, "Let's not talk about this unless, whatever you want to try and do in this, think in terms of being successful. 
